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I. PATIENT SAFETY AND INFORMATION POLICY
The medical malpractice crisis of the last few years has tapped
a lot of scholarly energy. Time not spent on original research-adding
to the store of knowledge about the medical malpractice system-is
often spent communicating with policymakers and the public. These
experiences have led us to think a lot about the amount and quality of
information circulating within or concerning the medical malpractice
system, and about public policy reforms that would improve
information flow in the future.
No grand theory has emerged from this meditation. Instead,
we have formed definite, though not immutable, opinions about a
desirable information policy for patient safety and medical
malpractice. Two specific recommendations convey a sense of our
view. First, the mandatory malpractice payment reporting provisions
of the National Practitioner Data Bank should be repealed. Second,
confidential settlements of tort claims in medical malpractice cases
should be prohibited, except perhaps as to the dollar amount of the
payment.
But aren't these inconsistent? The former would reduce
available information, while the latter would increase it.
Furthermore, wouldn't combining the two reforms be self-defeating,
with a net result of reconstructing national data simply by
aggregating individual settlements?
We hope to persuade readers of this Article that these
recommendations should receive a more favorable descriptor:
"pragmatic." For reasons explained below, any seamless information
policy is likely to reflect a foolish consistency-perhaps political
ideology, perhaps tunnel vision regarding policy goals or regulatory
silos-and should be avoided. Rather, information policy should be
incremental and contextual. That is, it should be sensitive to the
complicated, contentious history and psychology of health care quality
oversight and medical liability.
One can model malpractice information policy by envisioning a
"signal pathway" that divides the disclosure process into segments.
Beginning from a medical incident, the critical steps in conveying
information are content (signal), packaging (categorization), accessing
(transmission), and interpretation (processing) of malpractice-related
information about health care providers. Each stage of the pathway
modifies the signal as it moves forward. Therefore, significant
variables at each stage can affect the end result: what content is




The public debate over how governmental and professional
policies should manage the signal pathway is primarily a conflict over
access, with implications for accuracy, fairness, and effectiveness. All
participants and observers claim to support detailed signals and clear
categorization; disagreements arise over processing and its
implications for transmission. Health care providers argue that
limiting transmission through strict confidentiality rules allows more
accurate signals to emerge from the pathway. The medical profession
alone, they claim, can best determine what changes to its practices are
necessary. By contrast, others favor broad transmission, despite the
risk of reduced accuracy due to processing difficulties, on the grounds
that parties whose opinions matter to health care providers can exert
pressure on physicians to make such changes.
Physicians' objections often center on the presentation of an
event, rather than the substantive content. For many subjects of
profiling, the tools of informational accountability are too blunt. The
need for accessibility and comparability in any publicly available
database precludes the complete explanation of each item on a record.
Rather, public information tends to focus in a reductionist fashion on
tabulating incidents, thereby removing them from the context in
which they occurred.
The ongoing debate over medical error reporting illustrates the
complexities involved. Measurement and disclosure of error are
important components of patient safety policy, though sometimes in
contradictory ways. For example, the patient safety movement has
substantially increased public pressure for greater transparency
regarding physicians' and hospitals' mistakes, while simultaneously
seeking to expand legal protection that would allow health care
providers to keep internal efforts to detect and remedy safety
problems confidential. During the 1990s, moreover, an independent
governmental effort to protect patient privacy arose in response to the
Internet revolution in information transmission.1 Information policy
for medical errors therefore must take account of heightened
sensitivity regarding personal medical information.
There are also more general arguments supporting diversity in
malpractice information policy. First, there are competing
explanations for the information gaps that currently exist.
Inadequacy and asymmetry of information can be attributed to a
1. See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No.
104-191, § 264(c)(1), 110 Stat. 1936, 2033 (1996); Standards for Privacy of Individually
Identifiable Health Information, 45 C.F.R. § 164.500 (2001), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov. See
generally Lawrence 0. Gostin, James G. Hodge, Jr., & Lauren Marks, The Nationalization of
Health Information Privacy Protections, 8 CONN. INS. L.J. 283 (2001).
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professional conspiracy to conceal error (the "white coat of silence"),
reasonable fear among health care professionals of unfair retribution,
commercial and proprietary interests of liability insurers or provider
organizations, fragmentation of medical practice, lack of coordination
among structural branches and geographic divisions of government,
and insufficient social and private investment in information
technology.
Second, there are overlapping mechanisms for generating,
processing, and communicating information about safety and
malpractice. The tort liability system is governed by state-level
judicial rules punctuated by state legislative activity. Health care
quality oversight is conducted by state regulators, private
accreditation bodies such as the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Healthcare Organizations ("JCAHO"), internal institutional self-
regulatory processes, and-through payment policy rather than
explicit regulation-Medicare, Medicaid, and private health insurers.
Liability insurance is monitored by state regulators and actuarial self-
regulatory bodies. All three activities rely heavily on market
competition, although each strays considerably from textbook
microeconomic behavior.
2
Third, there are myriad visions of the relationship between
health care regulation and public policy. 3  An often-invoked
"professional paradigm," for example, vests physicians with primary
responsibility for quality control and uses law to identify and correct
departures from professional norms of competence and fidelity. A
"bioethics paradigm" gives primacy to individual autonomy, dignity,
and self-determination enforced through legal rights and remedies. A
"social justice paradigm" approaches health care as a societal resource
supported by collective contributions, with law seeking to define the
societal obligations of providers and to further equality of access and
outcomes for patients. A "market competition paradigm" looks to self-
interested relationships among producers of health care, end-users,
and various commercial intermediaries to achieve cost-justified
quality and to support efficient investment in future innovation. All
2. The classic depiction of market failure in health care is Kenneth J. Arrow, Uncertainty
and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 941 (1963). For a detailed
analysis of Arrow's thesis forty years after its exposition, see UNCERTAIN TIMES: KENNETH
ARROW AND THE CHANGING ECONOMICS OF HEALTH CARE (Peter J. Hammer et al., eds., 2003).
3. See, e.g., James F. Blumstein, Health Care Law and Policy: Whence and Whither?, 14
HEALTH MATRIX 35 (2004) (describing different models for thinking about the relationship
between health care regulations and public policy and discussing policy issues); Rand E.
Rosenblatt, The Four Ages of Health Law, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 155 (2004) (same).
[Vol. 59:4:12631266
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require information about patient safety and medical malpractice, but
for different purposes.
A striking fact about these organizing principles of health
policy is that they mix "private law" with "public law." Over the
course of decades, American health law has evolved from a sporadic
supplement to medical ethics in situations involving individual doctors
and patients to a structure governing nearly $2 trillion in annual
social expenditure. Medical malpractice law, for example, not only
seeks micro-justice for individual patients, but also aspires to improve
aggregate clinical practice. Efficient risk-bearing of malpractice costs,
reduction of defensive waste from imprecise liability standards, and
avoidance of unnecessary administrative expense have also properly
become concerns of malpractice policy.
Put differently, relational obligations of health professionals to
identifiable individuals are now entwined with regulatory obligations
to society at large. 4 The principal argument of this Article is that
sound information policy for medical malpractice and patient safety
must accommodate both relational and regulatory applications.
5
4. The general law of negligence is a modern construct, particularly its focus on deterrence
as well as compensation and justice. See, e.g., GUIDO M. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970) (suggesting deterrence and the cost of future accidents as
an economic rationale for tort law); Donald G. Gifford, Symposium: Calabresi's The Costs of
Accidents: A Generation of Impact on Law and Scholarship, 64 MD. L. REV. 1 (2005) (using
Calabresi's work to question whether liability damages achieve the goal of deterrence). Moreover,
negligence evolved largely in response to technological change, industrialization, and mass
production. See Mark F. Grady, Why Are People Negligent?: Technology, Nondurable Precautions,
and the Medical Malpractice Explosion, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 293 (1988) (demonstrating how
negligence changes and grows with new technology). A consequence of industrialization has been
to associate tort law with aggregate settlement of social claims and prevention of future injury to
society as a whole. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & John Fabian Witt, The Inevitability of
Aggregate Settlement: An Institutional Account of American Tort Law, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1571
(2004) (arguing that torts have resolved themselves into aggregate settlement structures);
Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Compensatory Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347
(2004) (arguing that punitive damages are awarded for the purpose of societal compensation).
However, a few scholars seek to preserve a private core of tort rights and remedies through
constitutional law. See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg, The Constitutional Status of Tort Law: Due
Process and the Right to a Law for the Redress of Wrongs, 115 YALE L.J. 524 (2005) (arguing that
tort law is a basic part of our governmental structure and should be understood as a redress for
private wrongs); John C.P. Goldberg, Tort Law for Federalists (and the Rest of Us): Private Law
in Disguise, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 3 (2004) (arguing that tort law should not be a form of
public regulatory law).
5. There are other ways to blend relational and regulatory concerns. For example, Leflar
and Iwata assert that in Japan criminal law plays a greater role than tort litigation in response
to medical errors. Robert B. Leflar & Futoshi Iwata, Medical Error as Reportable Event, as Tort,
as Crime: A Transpacific Comparison, 12 WIDENER L. REV. (forthcoming 2006) (hypothesizing
that Japanese prosecutorial objectives are well aligned with the objectives of victims of error
because prosecutors emphasize information, apology, and patients' personal needs).
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Accordingly, the Article distinguishes and explores three
categories of information use:
* Helping patients understand and participate in their
care;
" Improving patient safety, including analyzing medical
errors and identifying unsafe health care providers and
practices; and
" Assessing the performance of the medical liability
system in its many dimensions including deterrence,
compensation, justice, administrative efficiency, and
stability.
For each category, the Article comments on existing laws or
programs for information reporting or disclosure, points out major
tensions or ambiguities, and suggests pragmatic improvements.
II. RELATIONAL AND REGULATORY USES OF SAFETY INFORMATION
Gathering information, often as a prelude to making that
information widely available, is a common regulatory strategy.
However, the political consensus that frequently emerges in favor of
information-gathering equally often conceals divergent goals and
motivations for reporting requirements, limiting their utility in
practice. 6 Mandatory reporting to the government by the private
sector can be used to support existing regulatory responsibilities, to
facilitate (or delay) new legislative and regulatory initiatives, to
prompt self-examination and self-improvement among reporting
entities, and (through public disclosure) to empower individuals as
consumers or citizens.
The tensions affecting medical malpractice information policy
cannot be resolved as long as the precise purpose of disclosure remains
unarticulated. There are many possible objectives for gathering and
communicating information about medical malpractice. Relational
uses of information fall under two rubrics based on their respective
goals: to enhance competition among providers, or to make it more
likely that expert advisers will honor their responsibilities to the
people they undertake to serve. Relational disclosure typically
requires getting relevant information to private individuals or
entities, as government itself is seldom in a (permissible) position to
use' the information for its own benefit as a contracting party.
Therefore, government must collect the information through active
6. See generally William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and
American Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701 (1999) (analyzing the rationales for information
disclosure in managed care).
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research, retransmit reports passively received pursuant to a
reporting mandate, or require direct disclosure from information
possessor to information user. Further, it may not always be the case
that one of the two parties to a relationship has the information that
the other needs; government may need to require a third party to
release information, which is a regulatory function.
Regulatory, as opposed to relational, uses of information
contemplate the government acting in the interest of society as a
whole or a broad subset of the citizenry. Regulatory disclosure serves
two general objectives of its own: enhancing system performance and
supporting democratic processes. Using information to channel
behavior in directions desired by government, or otherwise to facilitate
direct government regulation of an activity, can be labeled a
"performance rationale." If government knowledge of an area
requiring regulation is inadequate and public research capacity is
limited, mandatory reporting without public disclosure is usually
sufficient for performance-motivated uses of information because it
forces private investment in information gathering. However, direct
disclosure obligations may be needed to create incentives for progress
in the direction desired by regulators when measurement has not
advanced to the point where government can intelligibly specify
design or performance standards, or when self-regulatory mechanisms
are superior to direct government intervention. Direct disclosure is
also important where the government's performance as an agent for
its citizens is primarily at issue. Circulating information in order to
justify the expenditure of public funds or foster deliberation over the
extent of social commitments can be described as a "democratic"
rationale for informational mandates.
A. Accountability versus Improvement
The current medical malpractice crisis differs from its late 20th
century predecessors in many ways, but the change most important to
information policy is the political ascendancy of "patient safety." One
of the authors has observed: "Patient safety may be the trigger that
finally propels [comprehensive malpractice reform] from the academic
literature into the real world."7 Although deterrence of substandard
7. William M. Sage, Medical Liability and Patient Safety, 22 HEALTH AFF., July/Aug. 2003,
at 26, 26, 34 (2003); see also William M. Sage, Understanding the First Malpractice Crisis of the
21st Century, in HEALTH LAW HANDBOOK (Alice G. Gosfield ed., 2003) (identifying and discussing
"four key areas in which changes to the health care system have altered both the ... malpractice
problem... and its range of potential solutions: patient safety, medical progress,
industrialization, and cost-containment"). One possibility would be a system analogous to
2006] 1269
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care is ostensibly the principal goal of medical malpractice liability,
legislative settlements of malpractice crises are typically focused on
restraining litigation through caps on damages and similar tort
reform, with seldom a nod to quality. Before the current liability
crisis, the prevalence and origin of medical error was a minor subject
in health policy and was absent from the debate over malpractice
reform. By replacing anecdote with data and by originating within the
medical and scientific establishment, the Institute of Medicine's 1999
report, To Err is Human, placed medical error on the national health
care agenda.8 Weeks after the report's release, a Kaiser Family
Foundation poll indicated that 51 percent of the public was aware of
the IOM's findings, an unusually high number.9 The report's estimate
that up to 98,000 patients die each year from preventable medical
errors galvanized public attention, drew comment from President
Clinton, launched Congressional hearings, and inspired patient safety
improvements within hospitals at JCAHO's behest.
In the five years since publication of the 10M report, however,
little concrete improvement in patient safety has been chronicled.
Physicians by and large remain complacent about safety,
notwithstanding public concern. 10  The Journal of the American
Medical Association recently published a retrospective review of the
IOM report, analyzing changes in its wake.'1 The authors' conclusion:
there is optimism for the future, but "the proven measured fruits of
the IOM report so far are few."' 2  Physicians remain unwilling to
admit errors; safety measures recommended by the IOM or
subsequent patient-safety advocates have not been implemented; even
efforts to measure patient safety are rarely in place.
The present malpractice crisis puts policymakers in a quandary
with respect to information about medical errors. Continuing
revelations of widespread safety lapses in health care have increased
pressure for public disclosure of physicians' and hospitals' safety
workers' compensation, featuring limited malpractice liability within a framework of reasonable
compensation and incentives to keep patients safe. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, FOSTERING RAPID
ADVANCES IN HEALTH CARE: LEARNING FROM SYSTEM DEMONSTRATIONS 81-89 (Janet M.
Corrigan et al. eds., 2002).
8. See generally INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH
SYSTEM (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000).
9. Duncan Moore, One Thing Leads to Another: Medical-Errors Report Means Money for
Medical-Outcomes Research, 30 MODERN HEALTHCARE 2, 2 (2000).
10. Robert J. Blendon et al., Views of Practicing Physicians and the Public on Medical
Error, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1933, 1933 (2002).
11. See generally Lucian L. Leape & Donald M. Berwick, Five Years After To Err Is Human:
What Have We Learned?, 293 JAMA 2384 (2005).
12. Id. at 2384.
1270 [Vol. 59:4:1263
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records. At the same time, the law's traditional focus on individual
physician responsibility is at odds with emerging theories of systems-
based quality improvement predicated on voluntary, confidential self-
reporting. On this account, both malpractice liability and public
disclosure create a "culture of blame" that arguably retards
organizational improvement by inducing physicians to withhold and
conceal information about medical errors. Thus it seems that two
important uses for information about medical error-accountability
and improvement-pull in opposite directions.
Does the threat of malpractice liability augment or reduce
information about medical error? As a practical matter, those
interested in measuring provider quality must rely on signals that are,
at best, proxy measures of 'true' quality of care. The types of
information available are far from ideal. Neither physicians nor
hospitals routinely produce reports on the errors they make, or almost
make. Instead, systems of forced accountability extrapolate these
incidents. Malpractice suits are among the most salient indicators of
quality failure, but there are many other forms of oversight and
censure within the industry, such as medical staff privilege decisions
by hospitals, affiliation decisions by managed care organizations, and
disciplinary actions by professional societies and state medical boards.
From these sources, potential signals include malpractice judgments
and settlements, probation and suspension histories, patient
complaints, staff incident reports, outcome statistics (provider report
cards), and data on "near misses." The usefulness of these measures
depends on the degree to which they corroborate the actual quality of
the physician, as opposed to merely recording the occasional bad event
or reflecting the biases of the decisionmaker. In fact, it is because of
their heterogeneous nature that signals require categorization to
make them useful as tools for quality improvement.
Signals differ in their specificity and sensitivity, which largely
determine their utility or potential to mislead. Sometimes competent
care is mistaken for negligence because the signal does not incorporate
outlying factors. The Harvard Medical Practice Study found that
nearly 85 percent of malpractice cases that resulted in compensation
featured no evidence of negligence. 13 Possible outlying factors include
a jury sympathizing with a severely disabled plaintiff, 14 a liability
insurer choosing to settle to avoid the expense of litigation, and
13. HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, PATIENTS, DOCTORS, AND LAWYERS: MEDICAL
INJURY, MALPRACTICE LITIGATION, AND PATIENT COMPENSATION IN NEW YORK (1990).
14. See Troyen A. Brennan et al., Relation Between Negligent Adverse Events and the
Outcomes of Medical Malpractice Litigation, 335 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1963 (1996) (finding
correlation between degree of physical impairment and litigation outcome).
2006] 1271
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failings in the underlying practice environment that do not
independently support legal relief, such as miscommunications among
providers that cannot clearly be prevented or restrictions imposed by
managed care organizations that are sheltered from suit by federal
ERISA law.
15
In other cases, because of imprecise signals, negligent care can
be mislabeled as competent. A doctor with a clean malpractice record
does not necessarily have a perfect practice. Because patients may be
ignorant of the facts of their case or averse to the delay and expense of
filing a claim, only a small number of avoidable injuries result in
payments through trial or settlement. The Harvard study concluded
that less than 7 percent of patients who suffer an injury as a result of
medical negligence receive financial compensation. 16 Additionally, a
hospital may offer to settle a case on the condition that individually
named physicians be dismissed as defendants.
Despite this imprecision within the malpractice system,
malpractice records are not uninformative. Physicians who practice
poor medicine are more likely to generate lawsuits than those who
meet the standard of care. 17 The informational value of malpractice
claims outcomes depends on the differences between cases that find
against a physician and those that do not. If the errors that result in
a malpractice payment are systematically more egregious or severe
than those that do not, then a provider's malpractice record may be an
informative signal, albeit one about relative rather than absolute
quality because the "standard of care" is a comparative construct.' 8 If,
on the other hand, the difference between cases depends mostly on
characteristics of injured patients and their families, such as attitudes
toward litigation and access to legal counsel, then cases pursued,
dropped, or never brought may look similar in clinical terms. If this is
the case, then malpractice claim outcomes say little about physician
quality. The same is true if poor communication skills, as opposed to
incompetence, is the primary driver of the lawsuit, although there is
15. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) preempts state law
claims relating to employee benefit plans. The Supreme Court recently held that ERISA
precludes recovery of extra-contractual damages (e.g., future medical expenses, pain and
suffering) from managed care organizations whose utilization review procedures denied patients
medically necessary treatment. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 213-14 (2004).
16. HARVARD MEDICAL PRACTICE STUDY, supra note 13.
17. Michelle M. Mello & David Hemenway, Medical Malpractice as an Epidemiological
Problem, 59 SOC. SCI. & MED. 39, 40 (2004).
18. Professional negligence is generally defined by state law as divergence from customary
practice, although some courts apply a standard closer to objective "reasonableness." Philip G.
Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom: Malpractice Law at the Millennium, 57
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163 (2000).
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increasing evidence that physicians who generate a large number of
patient complaints are also more likely to practice negligently.19
Some aspects of processing a patient safety signal, such as the
identity of the signal's recipient, are separate from the signal's nature.
Individuals without medical training may misinterpret signals when
selecting health care professionals as consumers or when being cared
for as patients. For doctors, there is bureaucratic risk because
insurance companies, hospitals, or other large organizations can be in
a position to discipline or dismiss affiliated physicians based on
quality reports that may not warrant such severe responses. The fact
of signal transmission can also change the behavior of the signal's
readers apart from the specific information received. For example,
patients may be more likely to sue if they lose confidence in health
care, which is one risk of increased public awareness of medical error
following the Institute of Medicine's 1999 report. 20 On the other hand,
a similar signal conveyed in a different manner may have the opposite
effect. Research on communicating with patients following medical
errors suggests that honest explanations and appropriate apologies
can decrease litigation.
21
Even if the medical profession were fully assured that signals
consisting of safety information would be accurate and immune from
misuse, there is no guarantee that such signals would in fact be
generated absent mandatory reporting and disclosure laws. Moreover,
there are several mechanisms by which information about malpractice
litigation and other indicators of patient safety might (or might fail to)
affect the delivery of health care. The politically charged debate over
accountability versus improvement therefore provides only a starting
point for information policy design, not a formula.
19. See generally Gerald B. Hickson et al., Patient Complaints and Malpractice Risk, 287
JAMA 2951 (2002).
20. Cf. Troyen A. Brennan, The Institute of Medicine Report on Medical Errors - Could It
Do Harm?, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1123 (2000) (suggesting that mandated disclosure of error
could also lead to more lawsuits).
21. See, e.g., Gerald B. Hickson et al., Factors That Prompted Families to File Medical
Malpractice Claims Following Perinatal Injuries, 267 JAMA 1359 (1992) (finding that many
families file claims because physicians are not open with them and not willing to talk to them);
Wendy Levinson et al., Physician-Patient Communication: The Relationship with Malpractice
Claims Among Primary Care Physicians and Surgeons, 277 JAMA 553 (1997) (finding that no-





Information-based regulatory strategies involving malpractice
and medical error often piggyback on market mechanisms for good
conduct. This "competition rationale" envisions identifiable buyers
and sellers of medical care engaging in transactions based at least in
part on quality. Seen through the lens of competition, poor provider
performance-failing to prevent patient injury, for example-is often
attributable to patients having inadequate information about the
individuals and institutions from which they seek treatment. Easily
accessible data regarding mishap rates might enable patients to select
less error-prone providers, which in a competitive market would weed
out poor performers and induce better performance by the rest.
22
Competitive uses of information are relational because their
utility depends on the outcome of two-party commercial interactions.
Public disclosure in health care would allow consumers to vote with
their feet. 23 Its application is primarily prospective: as-yet-uninjured
current patients and possible future purchasers are the most
important targets of information, not individuals who have already
been victims of medical error or injury. Patients with health
insurance shoulder little direct cost from seeking providers who take
extra precautions. This threat of lost business would place strong
incentives on providers to exercise sufficient care.
In a health care system dominated by third-party payment and
provider-payer contracting, information might also inform decisions by
employers, private health insurers, and even competition-minded
government programs regarding with whom to affiliate and how much
to pay. In essence, providers would compete on measurable safety to
attract business much as they currently compete on general
reputation.
The value of a government mandate, either for reporting or
direct disclosure, depends on factors familiar to those who justify
22. Many state "report card" systems for sharing information about errors involving health
plans and hospitals were initiated for the express purpose of helping consumers choose safe,
high-quality medical care. The best of these systems explicitly counsel readers that the
competitive potential of the information is limited. The first annual report of the Minnesota
Department of Health, for example, explained that hospitals' reporting habits vary and absolute
numbers of errors per hospital are small. The report also emphasized the utility of self-critical
analysis by health care providers (a performance rationale), but disclaimed a public regulatory
purpose for collecting and disseminating information about medical errors. See MINNESOTA
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, ADVERSE HEALTH EVENTS IN MINNESOTA HOSPITALS: FIRST ANNUAL
PUBLIC REPORT (2005), available at www.minnesotahealthinfo.org.
23. Marc A. Rodwin, Patient Accountability and Quality of Care: Lessons from Medical
Consumerism and the Patients' Rights, Women's Health, and Disability Rights Movements, 20
AM. J.L. & MED. 147, 153-54 (1994).
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regulation by identifying "market failures." These include consumers
not already having but wanting the information offered, private
mechanisms for obtaining the information being unavailable, buyers
rationally incorporating the information into their decisions and
having market opportunities to do so, government providing a credible
auditing and enforcement function, and the imposition of a legal
obligation not having negative effects on the quality, quantity, or cost
of response that outweigh the information's competitive benefits.
24
C. Agency
Information about malpractice and medical error can also have
agency-enhancing applications, making it easier for patients (as
"principal parties") to judge whether the physicians they consult are
acting in their best interests (as "agents") and enabling patients to
supplement gaps in agency through self-help. A patient who learns of
her physician's proclivity to commit errors or to allow injuries to result
from errors will be more vigilant when entrusting herself to that
physician. Such a physician's lapses will also reflect on her character
as much as her technical skill. Because serious malpractice can be
viewed as a proxy indicator of betrayal of trust, the patient (and other
physicians) may regard information about malpractice or medical
error as calling into question the subject physician's commitment to
upholding professional values. By revealing information, moreover,
the physician is honoring the dignity of the patient as a human being
worthy not only of compassion but also of respect.25 Following an
error or injury, an informed patient will also be better prepared to
mitigate loss both factually (e.g., by seeking alternative or additional
care) and legally (e.g., by filing a claim for compensation).
Information conveyed for these purposes is highly relational-
in fact, upholding professional agency obligations is a far more
intimate and personal goal than facilitating transactions in markets-
but does not depend for its effectiveness on any individual's
24. The complexities of information disclosure in health care have been studied primarily in
relation to managed care. See, e.g., Judith H. Hibbard et al., Strategies for Reporting Health Plan
Performance Information to Consumers: Evidence from Controlled Studies, 37 HEALTH SERVICES
RES. 291 (2002) (discussing the influence of information presentation on decision accuracy).
25. Mazor and colleagues presented patients with hypothetical situations involving medical
error and varying degrees of disclosure, and found that full disclosure by the physician was
associated with greater trust, satisfaction, and likelihood of remaining under the physician's
care. Kathleen M. Mazor et al., Health Plan Members' Views About Disclosure of Medical Errors,
140 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 409 (2004); see also Douglas N. Frenkel & Carol B. Liebman, Words
That Heal, 140 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 482, 482 (2004) ("Apologies have a potential for healing
that is matched only by the difficulty most people have in offering them.").
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commercial motivation or the existence of a functioning aggregate
competitive dynamic.2 6 The key factor for this rationale to succeed is
effective information exchange between agents and principal parties
because the fiduciary act of disclosure by an agent and the reflective
act of listening and responding by a principal matters in addition to
the specific information that is conveyed.
27
A direct disclosure mandate can be effective for these purposes,
but mandatory reporting and public availability of reported data is
not. Information that effectively serves the population of potential
future patients will likely differ in detail and mode of communication
from information that helps current victims of unexpected medical
outcomes. The interposition of an additional intermediary,
particularly a governmental body charged with receiving and
analyzing event reports, may even be destructive of agency because it
compromises the confidentiality at the heart of the agency
relationship. For this reason, inculcation of norms of conduct
regarding information exchange, with the hope of having those norms
internalized, may be strongly preferable under the agency rationale to
external observation and enforced compliance.
28
D. Performance
Antiquated systems for generating and sharing information are
often blamed for lack of safety and efficiency in American health care.
The cost of updating these systems has necessitated incremental
26. Some commentators elide the distinction between competitive uses of health care
information and agency-enhancing uses by emphasizing that patients value physicians of high
"interpersonal" as well as "technical" quality. See, e.g., Constance H. Fung et al., Patients'
Preferences for Technical Versus Interpersonal Quality When Selecting a Primary Care Physician,
40 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 957 (2005) (reporting respondents' reactions to simulated physician
report cards); see also AVEDIS DONABEDIAN, EXPLORATIONS IN QUALITY ASSESSMENT AND
MONITORING: THE DEFINITION OF QUALITY AND APPROACHES TO ITS ASSESSMENT (1980)
(distinguishing technical from interpersonal quality of care); Avedis Donabedian, Evaluating the
Quality of Medical Care, 44 MILBANK MEMORIAL FUND Q. 166 (1966) (same).
27. Current research on medical error disclosure emphasizes the process of disclosure, and
tends to favor early, iterative conversations that integrate information exchange with sound
medical care, rather than formal dispute resolution. See CAROL B. LIEBMAN & CHRIS STERN
HYMAN, MEDICAL ERROR DISCLOSURE, MEDIATION SKILLS, AND MALPRACTICE LITIGATION: A
DEMONSTRATION PROJECT IN PENNSYLVANIA (2005), available at www.pewtrusts.org (suggesting
four alternatives to formal litigation, including better early communication, information sharing,
mediation, and apologies); Kathleen M. Mazor et al., Communicating With Patients About
Medical Errors, 164 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1690 (2004) (reviewing empirical research on
disclosure and finding inadequate attention to the disclosure process and the consequences of
disclosure for patients and health care providers).
28. For an overview of norm theory, see Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development,
and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997).
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rather than immediate reform.29  Therefore, another reason to
circulate information about medical malpractice and medical error is
to spur performance improvement by health care providers. In theory,
understanding the prevalence of threats to patient safety, and
creating opportunities for detailed review and feedback (e.g., JCAHO's
"sentinel event" policy) can help reduce errors and avoid malpractice
disputes. Many researchers assert that medical errors are generally
the result of interconnected behavioral, technical, and organizational
missteps, rather than individual malfeasance. 30  Consequently,
counting errors and attributing them to individual physicians through
external disclosure may not be sufficient to prevent recurrences.
Rather, ensuring safety arguably requires systematic internal
collection and analysis of safety-related information.
Performance improvement is primarily a regulatory (and
professional self-regulatory) use of information. Performance-
enhancing information differs from competitive information because
the choice of what should be reported or disclosed, and therefore what
dimensions of safety should be improved, is made through consensus
regulation ideally based on overall benefit to society (including public
health) rather than individual marketplace decisions. It converges
with competition, a relational phenomenon, insofar as a greater
supply of safe medical care leads medical consumers to demand safety
more frequently. "Pay for performance" initiatives currently gaining
favor among government and private insurers offer a market
justification for greater internal generation and use of comparative
performance information.
31
For regulation to improve performance, past failures reported
to or detected by government must be susceptible to interpretation in
a fashion that accurately predicts future risk and prompts an effective
public or professional response, such as loss of license, disciplinary
monitoring, the adoption of ethical standards, or the imposition of new
safety regulations. Unlike the private market processes that benefit
29. See Rainu Kaushal et al., The Costs of a National Health Information Network, 143
ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 165, 165 (2005) (estimating that achieving information reform would
cost $156 billion in capital investment over five years and $48 billion in annual operating costs).
30. See generally INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 8 (asserting that even apparently
individual errors are usually attributable to multiple factors and that blaming individuals will
not reduce the likelihood that the same error will recur).
31. See William M. Sage, Pay for Performance: Will It Work in Theory?, 3 IND. HEALTH L.
REV. 305 (2006). However, physicians may have stronger motives for improvement than
marginal additions to consumer satisfaction or financial reward, such as maintaining their
standing within their profession and securing credentials that allow them continued access to
patients and the facilities and equipment needed to treat patients. These reputational costs to
physicians of safety lapses are not insurable; by contrast, the direct cost of compensating injured
patients is generally paid by liability coverage that is not individually experience.rated.
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from competitive information, however, performance regulation
constitutes state action and must not be used to deprive health care
providers of practice privileges without due process.
Laws requiring direct disclosure to the public can also further
performance improvement if they lead providers to invest in
measurement systems and engage in self-critical analysis that would
not be profitable absent a universal regulatory requirement (e.g.,
because a "first discloser's" performance would be misinterpreted by
consumers or because learning gleaned from measurement could not
be protected from competitors). This pathway to improvement
depends on the right information being required of the right health
care providers. For example, information drawn from individual
professionals may not be performance-enhancing if, in fact, outcomes
depend on processes mainly under the control of health systems.
E. Democracy
A final justification for information exchange involving
malpractice is to safeguard democratic processes of government. A
longstanding defense of litigation, and criticism of confidential
settlement, invokes the courts as guarantors of corrective justice
because of their transparency, which assures public airing of
grievances and public vindication of accused wrongdoers or erstwhile
victims. 32  Sharing information about facts underlying individual
malpractice cases, including medical errors that do not give rise to
claims, furthers this objective. 33
32. See generally Minna Kotkin, Invisible Settlement, Invisible Discrimination (Brooklyn
Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper. No. 39, Aug. 2005) (arguing against invisible
settlements of employment discrimination litigation). According to Kotkin, initial legal academic
reaction to media concern over invisibility of hazardous product and environmental litigation
emphasized the private interests of the litigants, id. at 26, while subsequent commentary has
focused on public interests in judicial oversight and deterrence of dangerous activity. Compare
Wayne D. Brazil, Protecting the Confidentiality of Settlement Negotiations, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 955
(1988) (discussing confidentiality within the context of settlement negotiations), and Arthur R.
Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427
(1991) (arguing against increased public access to information during litigation), and Wayne D.
Brazil, Protecting the Confidentiality of Settlement Negotiations, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 955 (1988),
with Laurie Kratky Dore, Secrecy by Consent: The Use and Limits of Confidentiality in the
Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283 (1999) (stating that public access in some
cases outweighs party confidentiality), and Richard A. Zitrin, Legal Ethics: The Case Against
Secret Settlements (Or, What You Don't Know Can Hurt You), 2 J. INST. STUD. LEGAL ETHICS 115
(1999) (stating that settlements that benefit the client can potentially harm the public interest).
33. In Pennsylvania, for example, the standard practice of the state's publicly administered
and subsidized supplemental malpractice insurance fund (currently called the MCARE Fund)
has been to include confidentiality provisions in settlement agreements. Letter from Michael J.
Foley (Sept. 11, 2003) (on file with author) (enclosing redacted correspondence from MCARE
Fund claims examiner stating that a "no publicity clause" is required in all MCARE Fund
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Collection and dissemination of information about the
aggregate achievements of the malpractice dispute resolution process
serve to reassure members of the public that airing and vindication
will be available to them if needed. Conversely, information about the
litigation system's failings, its high administrative cost, or its over-or
under-inclusiveness at converting medical errors into compensable
claims, helps citizens assess the arguments for reform. Similarly,
information about malpractice insurance markets can help the voting
public understand that critical component of overall medical liability
policy (and, in performance terms, can help government regulate
liability insurance more effectively).
The democratic rationale for information exchange is
regulatory; it operates primarily through collective deliberation rather
than by furthering the interests of individual users of health care. In
essence, the subject of the information exchanged is government itself
in its role as public agent for its citizens. For example, information
about underlying medical error rates helps educate voters about the
cost-effectiveness of America's colossal investment of public funds in
health care.
The source of information used for democratic purposes
presents a challenge. Whereas other uses of information allow
government to act as a neutral broker or public-spirited enforcer,
democratic information must be produced and shared free of
governmental control or interference lest the information be
manipulated to cast the government-or particular interest groups
that seek to influence it-in an unduly favorable light. Accurate,
unbiased information about the functioning of the malpractice system
can help counter exaggerations or misrepresentations by political
stakeholders, and can educate the public as to the spillover effects of
changes in medical liability on other legal-political arenas, such as
product liability.
III. USERS AND SOURCES OF INFORMATION
Elected officials seeking to address areas of public angst
regarding health care commonly turn to information as a seemingly
less intrusive form of accountability, while avoiding direct government
regulation of medical care that conflicts with longstanding norms of
releases). In one recent case, a state judge refused the settling defendants' customary request to
seal the terms of the settlement, citing the public's right to know how its tax dollars are being
used. Korczakowski v. Hwan, 68 Pa. D. & C.4th 129, 139 (2004) (denying motion).
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professional control.34 By appealing broadly to notions of liberty and
autonomy, information reporting and disclosure laws also successfully
bridge the gulf separating right from left in American political
ideology.35 For these reasons, information-based regulation was a
principal response to managed care in the 1990s.
36
Expanding consumer and patient access to information is also
a popular legislative accommodation to the newly recognized epidemic
of medical error. Because rising fears of error happen to coincide with
a "crisis" period in medical malpractice insurance, information is
sometimes offered as a quid pro quo for tort reform. 37 Medical error
reporting or disclosure obligations now exist under federal law, state
law, and private (e.g., JCAHO) accreditation standards, but with wide
variation in definitions of reportable events and in physician and
hospital compliance. This Part surveys the potential users of this




Patients. Transactions between patients and physicians are
relatively straightforward to analyze. Patients requiring medical
attention want safe and competent care from physicians. The
information available to patients for determining a doctor's
competency includes word of mouth, public records of various sorts,
information distributed by consumer groups, and less measurable
messages disseminated through the media. As noted above, patients'
ability to gain access to reliable information and to process it
accurately is often limited. Thus most patients apply the simple
heuristic that past behavior is a good predictor of future behavior, and
tend to avoid physicians whose records are tarnished.
Physicians. Information about a physician's safety record may
be of concern to other physicians. The extent of peer criticism depends
on the degree to which association with a "bad doctor" transfers to
other physicians. If referral networks and membership in physician
34. See generally Sage, supra note 6 (analyzing information disclosure as a response to
public concern about managed care).
35. Id. at 1825-26.
36. Id. at 1713-20.
37. Medical Care Availability and Reduction of Error (MCARE) Act, 2002 Pa. Laws. 154
(also referred to as "Act 13 of 2002").
38. A comprehensive compilation is beyond the scope of this Article. For an excellent review
of medical error reporting, see Maxine M. Harrington, Revisiting Medical Error: Five Years After
the IOM Report, Have Reporting Systems Made a Measurable Difference?, 15 HEALTH MATRIX
329 (2005).
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practice groups represent important sources of financial and
professional advancement, physicians can feel substantial pressure to
preserve their own safety records and monitor those of others.
Referring a patient to a bad doctor reflects poorly on the doctor who
issued the referral. One sloppy physician within a group practice can
tarnish the entire practice's reputation, as well as increase its liability
insurance costs. It seems reasonable to assume that vicarious
reputation is strongest among physicians with a tightly structured
relationship. Thus, monitoring the behavior of other physicians will
tend to be more important within small practices than for referrals
generally. Peer approval is also important to feelings of professional
self-worth apart from its effects on current earnings or future
prospects.
Hospitals. Hospitals, whether viewed as corporate employers
or as "workshops" for independent professionals, have an intimate
relationship with physicians. 39  Physicians are sometimes direct
employees of hospitals, but more typically are linked to hospitals by
the granting and oversight of admitting and treatment privileges by
the hospital's self-governing medical staff. Hospitals' peer-based
governance makes them an important setting in which physicians'
opinions of one another's records can affect earnings and career
opportunities. A physician's safety record is also important to
hospitals. The quality of a hospital's physicians helps it build its
reputation and sell its services. More concretely, hospitals are
concerned about errors committed by their physicians because they
are frequently named as co-defendants in lawsuits. Unlike
physicians, moreover, hospitals generally pay higher or lower
premiums according to their past history of malpractice exposure. 40
Health insurers. Health insurers, as third-party payers of
medical bills, are another group that may be concerned with a
physician's safety record. Insurers differ from the previously
discussed stakeholders because they face tradeoffs between quality
and price. Managed care companies selectively contract with
particular physicians to form preferred provider organizations
("PPOs") or health maintenance organizations ("HMOs"). A payer that
is unhappy with a particular physician's behavior can threaten to
terminate his or her contract.
39. See, e.g., Mark Pauly & Michael Redisch, The Not-For-Profit Hospital as a Physicians'
Cooperative, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 87 (1973) (proposing a structure in which nonprofit hospitals are
operated to maximize the net income of physicians).
40. Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the Evolution
of the American Health Care System, 108 HARv. L. REV. 381, 409-10 (1994).
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The quality of physicians under contract is a distinction worthy
of aggressive marketing to consumers. A physician's questionable
safety record, therefore, is usually a negative signal to payers.41
Payers also may be held vicariously liable for inappropriate care
delivered by their affiliated physicians (unless protected by the federal
ERISA statute), especially if the insurer advertised the quality of its
care to consumers. 42 Finally, if physicians who have been sued
previously are more likely to practice defensive medicine, the
provision of costly care of minimal benefit to the patient is undesirable
from the payer's perspective. 43 On the other hand, physicians with
very clean safety records may already engage in costly and time-
consuming patterns of practice that stray from a health insurer's ideal
of cost-effective care.
Plaintiffs' lawyers. Many physicians' greatest concern about
information transparency is that plaintiffs' lawyers will search
medical records selectively or take details out of context in order to
build a case against them. Researchers point to a resultant "chilling
effect" on quality control and peer review efforts, absent malpractice
reform.44 Signals about physician quality conveyed by malpractice
records indeed affect lawyers' decisions about whether to file (and how
strenuously to pursue) a complaint.45 Physicians with a record of
malpractice claims will presumably be more likely targets of future
legal action, all else equal.
Malpractice insurers. Liability insurers should use physician
safety information to guide their underwriting and premium pricing
decisions. However, physician malpractice coverage is not experience
rated, and malpractice carriers typically accept essentially all
physician applicants except during sharp downturns in the
41. See, e.g., Potvin v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 997 P.2d 1153, 1161-62 (Cal. 2000) (according
physician due process rights after "deselection" by health plan for excessive malpractice suits).
42. E.g., Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 212-13 (2004); Dukes v. U.S.
Healthcare, 57 F.3d 350, 358-59 (3d Cir. 1995).
43. The assumption is widely made, but lacks empirical support. See Peter A. Glassman et
al., Physicians' Personal Malpractice Experiences Are Not Related to Defensive Clinical Practices,
21 J. HEALTH POL. POLy L. 219, 233-34 (1996) ("[D]efensive practices, to the extent that they
exist, are not primarily due to individual physicians' malpractice experience."). For more detailed
models of selective contracting on "productive" risk taking, see Seth Angus Seabury, Three
Essays on Workers' Compensation (2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University).
44. Ronald G. Spaeth, Kelly C. Pickering & Shannon M. Webb, Quality Assurance and
Hospital Structure: How the Physician-Hospital Relationship Affects Quality Measures, 12
ANNALS HEALTH L. 235 (2003).
45. Plaintiffs' lawyers may take advantage of other sources of information to further their
clients' interests. In Pennsylvania, for example, one of us has heard anecdotes that plaintiffs'




underwriting cycle (i.e., malpractice crises).46 Externally available
information may still be valuable to liability insurers for predicting
aggregate exposure and setting specialty-specific premiums.
Others. Government officials and political actors constitute
additional audiences for physician safety information, including
legislators, regulators, and professional and trade associations. Other
groups interested in malpractice and safety include the media,
investment analysts, and academic researchers.
B. Reporting and Disclosure Mandates
1. Helping Individual Patients
Federal Policy. No federal law currently requires that patients
be told about medical errors, either as a direct regulation or as a
condition of participation in the Medicare or Medicaid programs.
However, the Veterans Health Administration has been a pioneer in
clinical error disclosure. After studies of error disclosure and
compensation for injury at the Veteran's Administration hospital in
Lexington, Kentucky, showed promise at reducing malpractice
litigation, 47 the Department of Veterans Affairs adopted a policy
stating that 'VHA facilities and individual VHA providers have an
obligation to disclose adverse events to patients who have been
harmed in the course of their care, including cases where the harm
may not be obvious or severe, or where the harm may only be evident
in the future."48
State Law. Disclosure of medical errors and unanticipated
outcomes of care has recently become law in four states: Florida, 49
Nevada, 50 New Jersey,51 and Pennsylvania.5 2 In Pennsylvania, the
46. See Mark Geistfeld, Malpractice Insurance and the (Il)Legitimate Interests of the
Medical Profession in Tort Reform, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 439, 452-58 (2005) (discussing the
reasons why medical malpractice insurance premiums are not experience rated). See generally
Tom Baker, Medical Malpractice and the Insurance Underwriting Cycle, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 393
(2005) (discussing how medical malpractice insurance underwriting works).
47. Jonathan R. Cohen, Apology and Organizations: Exploring an Example from Medical
Practice, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1447, 1454 (2000).
48. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, Disclosure of Adverse Events to Patients, VHA Directive
2005-049, (Oct. 27, 2005).
49. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 395.1051 (West Supp. 2006) (requiring hospitals to notify patients in
person about adverse incidents that result in serious harm).




first state to require error communication, disclosure by hospitals of
"serious events" is mandatory and must be made to both a new Patient
Safety Authority ("PSA") and the affected parties. The law defines a
serious event as one that either causes the patient's death or
compromises patient safety and results in unanticipated injury
requiring the delivery of additional health care services to the patient.
The PSA must be notified about such events within 24 hours of
discovery, and patients or their families must be notified within one
week.
Private Requirements. Self-regulatory pronouncements
regarding discussions between health care providers and patients are
typically hortatory rather than mandatory. The American Medical
Association, for example, imposes on physicians an ethical duty of
honesty with patients when medical errors occur, 53 and JCAHO
accreditation standards similarly urge hospitals to be forthcoming
with information in such situations. 54 In addition, various individual
medical institutions have adopted policies favoring error disclosure
and apology. 55
2. Improving Patient Safety
Federal Data. The National Practitioner Data Bank ("NPDB"),
which was chartered in 1986 as part of the Health Care Quality
Improvement Act, is the best-known repository for information about
quality lapses involving individual physicians. 56 The NPDB was
constructed as a disciplinary tool for the express use of medical
institutions, professional societies, and regulatory bodies. Disclosure
51. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:2H-12.25 (West Supp. 2006) (requiring patients to be informed,
with exceptions, about serious preventable adverse events and adverse events related to allergic
reactions).
52. 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1303.308 (West Supp. 2006) (requiring hospitals to notify
patients in writing of serious events).
53. The AMA's ethical guidance states: "Situations occasionally occur in which a patient
suffers significant medical complications that may have resulted from the physician's mistake or
judgment. In these situations, the physician is ethically required to inform the patient of all the
facts necessary to ensure understanding of what has occurred." AMA Council on Ethical and
Judicial Affairs, Code of Medical Ethics: Annotated Current Opinions, Policy E-8.12, available at
http://www.ama.assn.org/ama/pub/category/2712.html.
54. JOINT COMMISSION ON ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS,
COMPREHENSIVE ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS: THE OFFICIAL HANDBOOK, PATIENT
RIGHTS STANDARD RI.2.90, RI-12 (2003).
55. See Liz Kowalczyk, Hospitals Study When to Apologize to Patients, BOSTON GLOBE, July
24, 2005.
56. Health Care Quality Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 99-660, title IV, 100 Stat. 3784
(1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (2006)).
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of NPDB data is strictly limited; the general public is not permitted
access.
The NPDB contains physician malpractice histories along with
other compulsorily reportable actions such as licensure revocation or
suspension, medical staff discipline, and the exclusion of a practitioner
from Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement. Its creation was intended
"to improve the quality of health care by encouraging State licensing
boards, hospitals and other health care entities, and professional
societies to identify and discipline those who engage in unprofessional
behavior; and to restrict the ability of incompetent physicians,
dentists, and other health care practitioners to move from State to
State without disclosure or discovery of previous medical malpractice
payment and adverse action history."5 7  In addition to having
mandatory reporting obligations, hospitals participating in those
government insurance programs must query the NPDB about
physicians seeking medical staff appointments or clinical practice
privileges, and licensing bodies use the NPDB to verify the
applications of physicians who may have gotten into trouble
elsewhere.58
No similar mechanism exists to comprehensively record
information about hospitals or other institutional providers, although
the Medicare and Medicaid programs have several initiatives ongoing
to make consumer information publicly available on the Internet. The
most developed of these projects allows any user of the CMS website to
review "survey and certification" information about nursing homes,
such as violations and deficiencies found during inspections or as the
result of resident complaints. 59 Notwithstanding convincing literature
on system-based medical error, malpractice cases involving
institutions have never been regarded as sufficiently predictive of
quality to include in these reporting and disclosure programs.
Limited information about physician error may become public
from another federal data source: Medicare peer review organization
investigations. The Medicare program has struggled for decades with
the problem of identifying substandard physician care. Medicare
beneficiaries have long been empowered to request investigations by
57. National Practitioner Data Bank, http://www.npdb-hipdb.com/npdb.html (last visited
May 31, 2006).
58. Id. See also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, NATIONAL
PRACTITIONER DATA BANK: 2000 ANNUAL REPORT, available at http://www.npdb-
hipdb.com/annualrpt.html (2000).
59. See Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, Nursing Home Compare,
http://www.medicare.gov/NHCompare/Home.asp (last visited May 31, 2006) (listing quality
measures, specific deficiencies, and staffing statistics).
2006] 1285
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
"peer review organizations," but it was not until recently that a
federal court compelled the government to give complaining
beneficiaries the results of those investigations. 60
Additional medical error reporting systems not tied to
malpractice per se exist under federal food and drug law (post-
marketing surveillance of drugs and medical devices), through the
Centers for Disease Control for hospital-acquired infections, and by
the Veterans Administration with respect to care delivered by VA
hospitals. 61 These systems vary in their accessibility to the public.
The patient safety movement has expanded the federal role in
encouraging reporting and analysis of safety-related information apart
from direct governmental collection. In the late 1990s, JCAHO
proposed a Sentinel Events Policy to encourage the self-reporting of
"an unexpected occurrence involving death or severe physical or
psychological injury, or the risk thereof."62 Accredited hospitals were
provisionally required to analyze the root causes of detected errors,
and to create an action plan to prevent recurrences. Concern that
such information could be legally discoverable, thereby increasing
practitioner and hospital liability, led to protests from the American
Hospital Association and others.6 3 As a result, the reporting of
sentinel events to JCAHO was made voluntary, considerably
undermining the original goals of the policy.
The Institute of Medicine ("OM"), in its landmark report on
patient safety, subsequently advocated an expansion of safety-related
reporting to include a mandatory serious event reporting system
accompanied by a voluntary near-miss reporting system. 64 Serious
events would be disclosed to the public, while near-miss data would be
protected from legal discovery. The IOM recommendation steers a
middle course between the two informational camps of improvement
60. See Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 332 F.3d 654, 663 (2003)
(holding that the statutory requirement of notification "of the final disposition" included the
substance of that disposition, though not necessarily the underlying records); see also Michael L.
Silhol, Controversies Over Confidentiality: Public Citizen Sets Peer Review Records Free, HEALTH
LAW NEWS, Aug. 2003, at 38 (approving the court's reasoning).
61. Harrington, supra note 38, at 357-59.
62. JCAHO, Sentinel Event Policy and Procedures, http://www.jcaho.org (last visited May
31, 2006). JCAHO standards, though nominally voluntary, are de facto regulations for American
hospitals because hospitals that receive JCAHO accreditation are deemed to be in compliance
with Medicare's conditions of participation. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES,
MATERIALS AND PROBLEMS 182 (5th ed. 2004).
63. Bryan A. Liang, Risks of Reporting Sentinel Events, HEALTH AFF., Sept./Oct. 2000, at
112. See generally Brian A. Liang & Kristopher Storti, Creating Problems as Part of the
"Solution": The JCAHO Sentinel Event Policy, Legal Issues, and Patient Safety, 33 J. HEALTH
LAW 263 (2000).
64. INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, supra note 7.
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and accountability. Market forces would incentivize care through the
public disclosure of harmful errors. Meanwhile, protection of near-
miss data would encourage providers to report information that could
provide a substantial base from which safety improvements could be
designed by regulatory or self-regulatory bodies.
After years of political gridlock, Congress adopted much of the
IOM's reasoning in the Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act
of 2005.65 The purpose of the Act is to allow health care providers to
share and analyze data about medical quality without exposing
themselves to publicity and potential malpractice liability. The Act
establishes federal confidentiality and privilege protections for
information reported voluntarily to "patient safety organizations,"
with further disclosure to government (and the public) limited to
aggregate, de-identified data.
66
State Data. According to the National Academy for State
Health Policy, as of 2003, 21 states required reporting by physicians or
hospitals of information regarding medical errors, including
malpractice judgments and settlements. 67  Most state reporting
systems have features designed to allay physicians' fears that
information about adverse events will increase malpractice litigation.
Several states exempt reported information from freedom of
information laws or include in their reporting statutes specific
protections against discovery in litigation or admissibility in legal
proceedings. 68 Occasionally, states allow anonymous reporting or de-
identify and aggregate the data they receive. In nine states, however,
reported data are unprotected or subject only to general peer review
protections.6 9
States continue to adopt and expand these systems, which
usually allow public disclosure, in order to enhance patient safety,
improve health care quality, or monitor cost containment. 70  In
65. Pub. L. No. 109-41, 119 Stat. 424 (2005) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 299b-1 to 299c-6
(2006)).
66. Id. See also Deborah A. Datte, Kathleen Chancler & Paula Sanders, National Peer
Review Protection?: Understanding the New Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of 2005,
HEALTH LAW. NEWS, Nov. 2005, at 28 (discussing the new confidentiality privileges in the
context of peer-reporting).
67. MIMI MARCHEV, NATIONAL ACADEMY FOR STATE HEALTH POLICY, MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE AND MEDICAL ERROR DISCLOSURE: BALANCING FACTS AND FEARS 5 (2003),
available at http://www.nashp.org/FilesfMedicalMalpractice-and Medical Error-disclosure.pdf.
68. Id. at 4-7.
69. Id. at 7.
70. Illinois, for example, recently enacted the Illinois Adverse Health Care Events
Reporting Law of 2005, 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 522/10-1 to 10-50 (West 2006). The Illinois
act, which states its intent to be non-punitive, requires de-identified reporting by health care
facilities to the state Department of Public Health for analysis, feedback, and annual public
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Pennsylvania, for example, both mandatory and voluntary reporting
involves a state patient safety authority specifically chartered to take
a non-punitive approach to quality improvement that emphasizes
education of health care providers and the public.
71
Some states have compiled their own publicly available
practitioner databases. According to a recent review, thirty-two states
post physician profiles on the Internet for use by consumers. 72 While
most sites contain discipline and license data, many states also
include physician-specific information on medical malpractice
judgments, with a handful disclosing malpractice settlements as well.
Rhode Island and Florida have online report card systems that
exclude liability suit information. 73 Massachusetts and New York
have systems that include a summary of doctors' liability histories,
including selected information on malpractice settlements.
74
California recently approved the creation of a system that would
disclose settlement information for repeat offenders.
75
Concern that judgment and settlement information might
mislead consumers or unfairly blemish providers has led some states
to add disclaimers to their websites. For example, Virginia recently
modified its site to include a statement that paid claims vary by
specialty and that there is little evidence correlating a doctor's lawsuit
history with his or her competence. 76 Publicly disclosing settlements
is particularly contentious because many malpractice insurance
policies allow the insurer to settle without the physician's permission.
On the other hand, excluding settlements from disclosed information
allows physicians to evade reporting by settling suits confidentially.
Private Data. Health insurers constitute an important source
of public information about physician involvement in adverse medical
outcomes. However, studies suggest that online physician directories
compiled by health plans are often flawed, particularly with respect to
reports of surgical events, product or device events, patient protection events, care management
events, environmental events, and physical security events. The Illinois act does not require
direct disclosure to patients of these events.
71. See COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA PATIENT SAFETY AUTHORITY, 2004 ANNUAL
REPORT (2005), available at http://www.psa.state.pa.us.
72. Damon Adams, Pennsylvania, Virginia Latest States to Offer Physician Data Online,




76. Damon Adams, Doctors Resigned to Public Web Profiles, AM. MED. NEWS, May 5, 2003.
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information about physician quality.7 7 A consensus panel convened by
the National Committee on Quality Assurance, the primary
accrediting body for health plans, recently issued recommendations for
standardized information, including accurate, contextualized
presentations of disciplinary actions and malpractice history and
performance measures of quality. 78
Most provider-based efforts have focused on quality
improvement through voluntary, confidential self-reporting.
Physicians, nurses, and other health professionals are ideal reporters,
as their presence during care delivery places them in the best position
to comment upon what transpired. Limited experience suggests that
assuring confidentiality for medical error reporting can dramatically
influence participation. 79  Indeed, one study found that the
implementation of a non-punitive reporting system led to a tenfold
increase in the number of reports.80
The most extensive of these applications has been developed in
the area of blood safety and is known as the Medical Event Reporting
System in Transfusion Medicine ("MERS-TM"). MERS-TM is
employed by more than 30 hospitals in the United States, Canada,
and several European countries, and is designed to collect, classify,
and analyze data on events that could threaten the safety of
transfused blood.81 Experience rolling out the system suggests that
the no-fault nature of reporting has been crucial to participation.8 2
77. ELLIOT M. STONE, JERILYN W. HEINOLD & LYDIA M. EWING, COMMONWEALTH FUND,
ACCESSING PHYSICIAN INFORMATION ON THE INTERNET (2002), available at http://www.cmwf.
org/publications/publications-show.htm?doc id=221298.
78. LINDA SHELTON, LAURA AIUPPA & PHYLLIS TORDA, COMMONWEALTH FUND,
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF PHYSICIAN DIRECTORY INFORMATION ON THE
INTERNET (2004), available at http://www.cmwf.org/publications/publications-show.htm?doc_id=
234619.
79. See, e.g., Anne C. O'Neil et al., Physician Reporting Compared with Medical-Record
Review to Identify Adverse Medical Events, 119 ANN INTERN MED 370, 374 (1993) (noting that
124 case-patient reports were filed under the confidential system versus 85 via medical record
review); C.E. Shea, The Organization of Work in a Complex and Dynamic Environment: The
Accident and Emergency Department (1996) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Manchester, UK).
80. Harold S. Kaplan et al., Identification and Classification of the Causes of Events in
Transfusion Medicine, 38 TRANSFUSION 1071, 1073 (1998).
81. Letter from Barbara Rabin Fastman, Project Director, Medical Event Reporting System
(MERS) (Sept. 2003) (on file with authors). MERS-TM employs a six-step process: 1) Identify,
disclose, and document the event; 2) Determine the extent of investigation needed; 3) Investigate
and conduct a root cause analysis, if appropriate; 4) Classify the event using standardized codes;
5) Analyze the aggregate data to identify systematic patterns and trends; and 6) Use the results
to determine appropriate responses. James B. Battles et al., The Attributes of Medical Event-
Reporting Systems: Experience with a Prototype Medical Event-Reporting System for Transfusion
Medicine, 122 ARCHIVES OF PATHOLOGY & LABORATORY MED. 231-38 (1998).
82. E.g., Kaplan, supra note 80.
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With respect to the impact of reporting on safety, however, experience
at one Canadian hospital was mixed: educational sessions were
ineffective, but the adoption of computerized labeling and printing
devices for use at the bedside appeared moderately successful.8 3
3. Evaluating the Medical Liability System
No comprehensive source of information with which to evaluate
the overall performance of the medical liability system currently
exists. Rather, data tend to be gathered separately by agencies of
government involved in three activities that have historically been
considered distinct: patient safety (considered above), liability
insurance, and civil litigation.
Insurance. Insurance regulators in 27 states currently require
reporting of medical liability insurance information.8 4 Of these, eight
states maintain large databases of closed claims reports, but only
Texas and Florida allow public access.8 5  Malpractice insurance
reporting in some states relates to general ratemaking or rate review
under state insurance law; other states have adopted reporting
programs during malpractice crises to provide specific information on
medical liability.
The Texas Closed Claim Database ("TCCD"), for example, has
received over 150,000 reports since 1988 involving payments for bodily
injury under medical professional liability policies and four non-
medical lines of liability insurance. The TCCD contains individual
reports of claims involving payouts of more than $10,000, and
aggregate reports of smaller claims.
In addition to individual insurance databases, the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners ("NAIC") surveys states
quarterly, and reports aggregate, company-specific information about
claims. The Insurance Services Office, a private organization that
advises state regulators as well as private insurers, surveys many
markets and reports on changes in insurance premiums and losses.
Litigation. In addition to tracking federal court statistics, the
U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics ("BJS") civil justice survey of state
courts examined general civil cases (including medical malpractice)
83. See generally Jeannie L. Callum, et al., Reporting of Near-Miss Events for Transfusion
Medicine: Improving Transfusion Safety, 41 TRANSFUSION 1204 (2001).
84. NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, STATISTICAL INFORMATION
TASK FORCE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE SURVEY RESULTS (Feb. 2006) (on file with authors).
85. Bernard Black et al., Stability, Not Crisis: Medical Malpractice Claim Outcomes in
Texas, 1988-2002, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 207, 211 (2005). The states are Florida, Illinois,
Missouri, Minnesota, Massachusetts, Nevada, Texas, and Washington.
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concluded by bench or jury trial in a sample of the nation's 75 most
populous counties in 2001. BJS data includes type of case, nature of
plaintiffs and defendants, trial outcomes, total damages, punitive
damages, and case processing time.86
In a handful of states, either local judges and courts or the
state judicial system as a whole collects information about filing and
disposition of medical malpractice lawsuits. In Pennsylvania, for
example, tracking of filings and court outcomes was incorporated into
the state's response to the current liability crisis.8 7
IV. TENSIONS AND AMBIGUITIES
A seamless information policy for patient safety and
malpractice is unlikely when one considers the coordination that
would be required among the various producers of mandated
information, production mandates, and potential users and uses. The
goal of this Part is to help readers distinguish practical from
impractical information requirements, so that they can better predict
whether desired or unintended effects of a particular legal mandate
are likely to dominate in practice. Three major cross-cutting tensions
affect the meaning of information about harm or potential harm to
patients. These are the relative contributions to patient safety of
individual professional behavior and health system design, the
complex role reputation plays in professional and corporate responses
to safety information, and the relationship between "safety" and
"quality" information in health policy debate.
A. Individuals, Systems, and the Aggregation Problem
A central question for information policy is whether individual
physicians, medical groups, hospitals, or health insurers should
constitute the reporting unit (i.e., be charged with the obligation to
disclose information) or the reportable unit (i.e., be identified as
subject to performance measurement). Many patients expect that the
revelation of error will distinguish heroes from villains within the
physician community. Patient safety experts tend to disagree with this
approach, contending instead that most errors in health care delivery,
while human in proximate cause, ultimately flow from faulty
86. Catherine M. Sharkey, Unintended Consequences of Medical Malpractice Damage Caps,
80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 391, 447 (2005).
87. See generally ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY, MEDICAL
PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY REFORM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY: A REVIEW OF POLICY OPTIONS (Mar.
2005), available at http://jsg.legis.state.pa.us/Med%20Mal.PDF.
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institutional processes. This confluence of mistakes-both latent
system errors and active human errors-demands careful analysis by
the relevant health care organization in order to determine the cause
and identify a remedy that can help prevent future occurrences.
88
The optimal unit for producing information should be the unit
most capable of analyzing that information and acting on it to reduce
medical errors. The patient safety movement-which emerged as an
evidence-based alternative to professional complacency about error
but which continues the medical profession's longstanding preference
for self-regulation over outside review-has consistently focused on
hospitals. Hospitals are the locus of most serious injuries; they have
in place mechanisms for collegial consultation (peer review) through
their self-governing medical staffs; and they possess the financial
wherewithal to invest in safety. Hospitals tend to be more efficient
bearers of financial risk and more effective purchasers of liability
insurance than individual physicians, and tend to be easier to track
and monitor as well. Unlike physicians, hospitals self-insure liability
exposure or purchase experience-rated coverage, giving them a clearer
financial stake in safety. And hospitals cannot relocate to escape a
tarnished reputation. Hospitals also may compete explicitly on safety
in order to attract patients and managed care contracts.
This is all likely correct as far as it goes, but the problem of
optimal data aggregation is a general challenge for information
reporting and disclosure. Patient safety information falls along a
spectrum from rare events of great apparent impact, such as patient
deaths and multi-million dollar malpractice judgments, to more
frequent but mundane occurrences such as patient complaints and
"incident reports." Jury verdicts in malpractice cases make news, but
the vast majority of claims are dropped or settled out of court.8 9
Among those cases that are actually brought to verdict, most of them
result in a judgment in favor of the defense. In a recent study of suits
in Florida, approximately 93 percent of all claims were settled, and
88. For an overview of "human factors engineering," see JAMES REASON, HUMAN ERROR
(1990).
89. See, e.g., Henry S. Farber & Michelle J. White, Medical Malpractice: An Empirical
Examination of the Litigation Process, 22 RAND J. ECON. 199, 204 (1991) (referencing an
empirical study that demonstrates only five percent of malpractice suits reach a trial outcome);
Patricia M. Danzon, Liability for Medical Malpractice, in HANDBOOK OF HEALTH ECONOMICS
1339 (Anthony J. Culyer & Joseph P. Newhouse eds., 2000). Moreover, jury verdicts themselves
often exaggerate the financial implications of error. A recent study comparing jury verdicts in
Texas to actual payments found that few very large verdicts were paid in full, and the median
reduction was substantial. See David A. Hyman et al., Do Defendants Pay What Juries Award?:




only 2 percent resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff.90 Probations and
license suspension are also rare, with only a few episodes of
incompetent care resulting in disciplinary action within the
profession. 91
Error reporting systems often focus on "near misses": mistakes
that did not lead to significant harm. Because no injury resulted,
reporters are less likely to fear the repercussions of disclosing near
misses to their employers or colleagues. The near-miss reporting
movement is also predicated on the iceberg principle, which asserts
that realized harm is only a small fraction of the threats that lurk
beneath the surface. Near misses provide more data to help identify
the underlying causes of errors and the steps necessary to prevent
them from recurring. The relationship between near misses and
actual injuries resembles a pyramid. The peak is the most visible but
represents a small fraction of the total events. FDr example, one study
reported that for every transfusion-related death in New York there
were 47 ABO-incompatible transfusions and 128 incorrect units of
blood transfused. 92
Which events should be reported and disclosed, and by whom?
It depends on the purpose of reporting or disclosure. Disclosure to
help individual patients or families deal with events unfolding in real
time lacks the statistical dimension that makes data aggregation
necessary for improving patient safety or evaluating the malpractice
system as a whole. In the individual circumstance, relevant
considerations include the closeness of the personal relationship
between the discloser and the patient or family, the degree of
knowledge the discloser possesses about the error's cause and
implications, and the resources at the discloser's disposal to mitigate
the harm resulting from the error.
Disclosure to improve general patient safety, by contrast,
invokes different priorities. If improvement is most likely to result
from market competitive processes, the competitor (e.g., an entire
hospital or health plan) is the logical unit of reporting. If, however,
the greatest performance gains are likely to emerge from professional
90. Holger Sieg, Estimating a Bargaining Model with Asymmetric Information: Evidence
from Medical Malpractice Disputes, 108 J. POL. ECON. 1006, 1009 (2000).
91. According to Public Citizen, there were 3,296 serious disciplinary actions taken by
states against physicians in 2004. Citizen.org, Ranking of the Rate of State Medical Boards'
Serious Disciplinary Actions: 2002-2004, http://www.citizen.org/publications/release.cfm?
ID=7380 (last visited May 31, 2006).
92. Jeanne V. Linden et al., Transfusion Errors in New York State: an Analysis of 10 Years'
Experience, 40 TRANSFUSION 1207, 1209 (2000).
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self-regulation, the optimal reporting unit might be a hospital
department or other team setting.
Evaluating the overall malpractice compensation and dispute
resolution system raises still other concerns. The reportable units in
this context will be individuals or organizations that bear certain key
responsibilities, such as purchasing liability insurance, taking claims
to court, and paying compensation. A complete picture may be easiest
to generate if the reporting units collectively represent the universe of
desired information and can be easily monitored for compliance. For
example, reporting by liability insurers alone is likely insufficient
because many hospitals currently self-insure malpractice risk.
Aggregating events into useful data has several dimensions.
One part of the aggregation problem is statistical. For any level of
correlation between available signals and underlying quality, more
observations provide greater confidence and allow more reliable
decisionmaking. Whether the goal is to compare one health care
provider to another or to create benchmarks for normal or optimal
performance, it is mathematically desirable to pool as many similar
events as possible. Two health care providers experiencing 400 and
100 events respectively in a given year are more likely truly to differ
with respect to safety performance than two health care providers
experiencing four and one events in that year.
Another part of the aggregation problem is causal. To be
useful, reported events must predict the differences that matter to
patients or policymakers. Studying near misses is only instructive if it
facilitates the prevention of actual harm. Allowing 400 rather than
100 prescriptions for incorrect dosages of insulin to be sent by nursing
units to a hospital pharmacy, for example, is a meaningful difference
if detection of incorrect prescriptions at the pharmacy, or of incorrect
dosages sent back to the units by the pharmacist, is imperfect or more
expensive. Its significance depends as well on the reliability and cost
of procedures for treating patients who receive incorrect dosages. If
one hospital has an outstanding insulin administration team that
another hospital lacks, the fact that the first hospital had four patient
deaths from insulin error and the second hospital only one death
might be a more important piece of information.
The real value of near-miss reporting depends upon the degree
to which near misses and harm-causing errors share underlying root
causes. Are the precursor events to near misses similar to those
associated with harm? Evidence from years of near-miss data
reporting in the commercial aviation setting suggests that the answer
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is an affirmative answer. 93 Moreover, a comparison of causal events in
medicine and other industries seems to suggest a pattern that is
independent of domain, offering hope that the success of near-miss
reporting in those industries can be repeated in medicine. In hospitals,
for example, research on transfusion medicine confirms that, at least
for near misses with the highest potential for harm, the distribution of
causal factors between actual events and near misses is not
significantly different.
94
In some situations, individual physicians or pockets of
professional organization such as hospital departments may have
greater influence over safety performance than umbrella corporate
entities such as entire hospitals or health plans. Insufficient sample
size may make it impossible (or at least impractical given collection
costs) to say anything reliable about smaller groups even if in causal
terms it would be valuable to quantify their experience.
Because information processing requires interpretation,
optimal aggregation also depends in part on audience. Individuals
often respond to information about risks such as medical error in
predictable ways, based on well-established cognitive biases.95 Who
discloses and what they report will influence the importance
individuals ascribe to disclosure, even if the statistical significance
and objective value of the information at predicting ultimate harm are
unaffected. Salient events such as sudden surgical deaths or large
jury awards in malpractice cases might arouse particularly strong
emotions in individual recipients of information, as might events
involving celebrity physicians or well-known academic medical
centers. If disclosed to fellow physicians, the same information might
have less significance as marking serious safety problems-probably
far less for jury verdicts, which physicians consider unreliable
indicators of actual negligence. However, "correcting" for bias is
technically difficult and may not be normatively justifiable. For
example, a jury verdict against a physician in a malpractice suit may
strike patients as more damning than a settlement simply because it
is more visible-a framing error that information policymakers might
want to correct. Alternatively, patients may view a verdict as more
damaging because a finding in open court suggests that the jury
perceived the physician to be untrustworthy, which is a matter of
93. See HuMAN FACTORS IN AVIATION (Earl L. Wiener & David C. Nagel eds., 1988).
94. See Callum, supra note 83, at 1204-05 (noting that the aviation industry has used
near-miss data to improve safety).
95. See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the
Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981) (concluding that a decisionmaker's frame of
reference can influence or dictate choices).
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subjective valuation that information policymakers might decide to
respect.
In sum, whether individual physicians or health systems (such
as hospitals) should provide information about malpractice and
medical error is not a binary choice. The inevitability of structural
and scientific evolution in health care delivery argues for a flexible
approach. Managed care offers a cautionary tale for information
regulators. In the early 1990s, managed care organizations seemed
the natural unit for both reporting and reportability. They aggregated
large numbers of "covered lives," asserted plenipotentiary authority
over health care delivery, invoked an ethic of "population health"
instead of relational obligation, and professed the virtues of data (e.g.,
practice guidelines, provider profiling) over habit and anecdote.
However, the source of managed care's relative freedom from
professional customs and constraints was the profit motive. This
created an additional argument for stricter regulation, including
information disclosure, and regulation in turn both weakened
managed care and made it less attractive to health care purchasers-
as proponents of regulation indeed hoped it would. The consequence
for public policy was to produce more information but with less utility.
Historical data for a particular health plan was hardly useful when
the hospitals and physicians affiliated with that plan changed
annually, and comparative statistics meant little after both utilization
review and selective physician contracting fell from favor.96 Reporting
and disclosure by managed care organizations remain valuable for
overall assessment of health system performance-and for
comparative dimensions that are still under health plan control, such
as preventive care or disease management-but not for malpractice or
patient safety.
B. Reputation
The medical profession often presents external accountability
for medical error and internal improvement of patient safety as
mutually exclusive approaches to information-based regulation. There
is undoubtedly tension between the two goals, as discussed in
preceding Parts, because physicians who know their mistakes will be
aired publicly if detected may prefer to conceal them. What is
surprising, however, is the depth of feeling behind physicians'
assertions of tension, and the lack of natural correctives. In part,
96. For an account of the divergence of managed care from its expected path of
development, see William M. Sage, Enterprise Liability and the Emerging Managed Health Care
System, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 191-95 (1997).
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physicians are adamant about the adverse consequences of error
disclosure because they regard external accountability as synonymous
with much-despised malpractice litigation. This oversimplification
delights tort reformers, who rush to insert it into political debate.
Furthermore, markets for health care are deeply flawed, so that
physicians seldom need engage in active safety improvement to satisfy
consumer demand.
Why does malpractice liability provoke such strong emotions,
and why are malpractice and information so closely entwined in
physicians' minds? Answering these questions requires exploring the
complex sociology of reputation in professional medical practice.
Doctors' resistance to public disclosure of their mistakes extends
beyond a fear of courts, which are rarely involved in malpractice suits,
and the cost of settlements, which are typically paid by insurance.
Reputation has traditionally been at the center of medical
professionalism, affecting self-image, collegial relationships, and the
economics of access to patients.97 A hundred years ago, lawyers
threatened individual physicians' stature in small communities simply
by cross-examining them in open court.98  Professional reputations
remain fragile because medicine is still both personal and uncertain,
with uncertainty heightened by rapid scientific progress and
ballooning government regulation.99 For example government fee
schedules, managed care, and direct-to-consumer drug advertising
influence physicians' feeling of control (or loss thereof) over their work
environments.
Because of shame and guilt, whether deserved or not,
physicians (and nurses or other health professionals) are potential
victims of medical error as well as contributors to it. Handled well,
97. William M. Sage., Reputation, Malpractice Liability, and Medical Error, in
ACCOUNTABILITY: PATIENT SAFETY AND POLICY REFORM 159 (Virginia A. Sharpe ed., 2004).
98. See JAMES C. MOHR, DOCTORS AND THE LAW: MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA 198 (1993) ("A lapse at any point in the process, an emotional outburst during
cross-examination, much less an actual mistake, could all ruin a promising career almost
instantly.").
99. Concern for reputation arises explicitly from time to time in laws and judicial decisions
involving information about medical errors. Allegations of physician misconduct that prompt
investigations by state medical licensing boards for potential disciplinary action are typically
kept confidential. Courts may be called on to reconcile these provisions with newer medical error
reporting and disclosure laws. See, e.g., Anonymous v. Bureau of Profl Med. Conduct, 2 N.Y.3d
663 (2004) (affirming appellate division holding that a physician reprimanded on a single
disciplinary charge and exonerated on others was entitled to confidentiality for reputational
reasons notwithstanding an amendment to New York law requiring public disclosure of findings
that result in annulment, suspension or revocation of license); see also Johnson Newspaper Corp.
v. Melino, 77 N.Y.2d 10, 11 (1990) ("[Confidentiality] also evinces a sensibility to the possibility
of irreparable harm to a professional's reputation resulting from unfounded accusations.").
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the experience of error can awaken physicians to both the scientific
and emotional motivations for their clinical decisions, inspire self-
reflection and collective, evidence-based improvement, and reaffirm
their ethical obligations to patients. Handled poorly, error can
alienate physicians and inure rather than sensitize them to failure,
perpetuate denial among their equally fallible but as yet unblemished
colleagues, and provoke waves of superstitious avoidance that
masquerade as defensive medicine but that often diminish quality and
increase risk of harm.
100
Reputation is fundamentally formed by information, ranging
from local gossip to more formal metrics such as mandatory
performance disclosure. Individual reputation is a function of public
perception; once achieved, reputations tend to be stable unless new
information appears that radically contradicts expectations.
Individual reputation also exists within definable communities of
social peers, with the subject of judgment attempting to maintain
strict separation between private facts and public image.
Malpractice suits possess many qualities physicians find
threatening to reputation. They are challenges from outside the
professional fold and therefore presumptively illegitimate. They
represent the pursuit of financial self-interest (by lawyers), and they
suggest personal betrayal (by patients). For these reasons, a vigorous
malpractice defense is tantamount to a defamation claim against a
false accuser, although opportunities for physicians to gain actual
vindication are few and far between. This insight helps explain why
physicians resist allowing liability insurers, who bear risk of financial
loss but not loss of reputation, to settle cases without their consent
even though doing so can be expected to reduce physicians' premium
payments. An exception, of course, is when settlement comes with an
iron-clad assurance of confidentiality.
Feelings about malpractice suits carry over to other sources of
information about patient safety and medical error. Even if data are
used appropriately, mandatory information disclosure creates
incentives that affect the type and amount of information that is
collected. Specifically, any form of conditional reporting will create a
selective data set by inducing health care providers to avoid the
100. See David M. Studdert et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Specialist
Physicians During a Malpractice Crisis in a Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 JAMA 2609,
2616 (2005) (explaining the negative effects of defensive medical practice); Peter P. Budetti, Tort
Reform and the Patient Safety Movement: Seeking Common Ground, 293 JAMA 2660, 2660-61
(2005) (reflecting on Studdert's study).
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conditions that trigger a duty to report.101 Individual professionals'
exquisite sensitivity to reputational harm magnifies these effects.
The National Practitioner Data Bank exemplifies the
interactions between safety information and physicians' reputational
priorities. The NPDB has bred physician resistance and resentment
ever since its enactment as a quid pro quo for broadening physicians'
peer review immunities in the Health Care Quality Improvement Act
of 1986.102 As described above, the NPDB collects reports of state
disciplinary actions and hospital privileging decisions against
physicians, and makes that information available to licensing and
credentialing bodies nationally. Payments in malpractice cases must
also be reported.
Physicians' unease over the existence and contents of this
"permanent record" of malpractice outcomes in the hands of the
federal government has been profound, even though the NPDB is not
publicly accessible. Physicians often refuse to settle arguably
meritorious claims because they fear NPDB reporting, and hospitals
routinely procure dismissals of individual physicians as named
defendants in order to circumvent their reporting obligations.
Perhaps most discouragingly, the Data Bank is plagued by substantial
underreporting of settlements for which a reporting duty clearly
exists. Many providers simply refuse to participate, highlighting the
voluntary nature of even mandatory systems. According to the
Department of Health and Human Services, a majority of hospitals in
31 states failed to file a single data bank report in the NPDB's first
decade of operation. 10 3 Similar concerns have been raised in other
patient safety contexts, such as the possibly paradoxical effects on
access and quality of instituting cardiac surgery report cards. 10 4
101. See William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure Laws and American
Health Care, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1781-82 (1999) (discussing selective performance
improvement in response to disclosure requirements).
102. Health Care Quality Improvement Act, (HCQIA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (2006).
HCQIA responded in large part to the threat of treble damages in antitrust litigation against
physicians whose peer review activities denied hospital privileges to a competitor. See Patrick v.
Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 98-99 (1988) (upholding a $1.95 million judgment against physicians in a
small town in Oregon).
103. Damon Adams, Study Charges Underreporting in National Practitioner Data Bank, AM.
MED. NEWS, June 18, 2001.
104. See, e.g., Rachel M. Werner & David A. Asch, The Unintended Consequences of Publicly
Reporting Quality Information, 293 JAMA 1239 (2005) (suggesting ways in which disclosure may
distort physician practice and harm patients); David Dranove et al., Is More Information Better?
The Effects of "Report Cards" on Health Care Providers, 111 J. POL. ECON. 555, 555-56 (2003)
(providing empirical evidence that cardiac surgery report cards in New York and Pennsylvania
led providers to avoid risky cases).
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These reactions not only undercut the accuracy of the data, but
also contort medical practice in unpredictable ways that may harm
patients. In the heyday of managed care, for example, physicians
found themselves being casually "deselected" from insurance
networks, to the detriment of continuity of care. This practice was
contractually permissible in part because physicians' own lawyers had
refused to limit termination to enumerated causes that would trigger
mandatory NPDB reporting. Occasionally, NPDB leverage can induce
physicians to cooperate in activities that are progressive from a
patient safety perspective. In Colorado, the largest malpractice
insurer operates an early disclosure and compensation program for
minor injuries that allows physicians to escape NPDB reporting
because payment is offered voluntarily before a lawyer is engaged or a
claim is filed, and is not conditioned on release of liability. 10 5 Overall,
however, it is likely that patients would be better off if the malpractice
reporting provisions of the NPDB were repealed, 106 not least because
NPDB information appears to be of limited utility for purposes of
rating physician quality.107
One possible resolution of this tension would be to create
incentives for reporting despite the existence of liability by reducing
penalties if reporting is diligent.108 This type of approach is common
in situations in which fraud is being committed against the
government. Unless such financial incentives were embedded in an
administrative compensation system for patient injury based on error
reporting and analysis, however, it is less intuitive for the law to grant
relief from private liability in return for public reporting, which would
be the case for medical malpractice, than for the government to reduce
its own recovery when misdeeds are self-reported, as might be the case
for Medicare fraud enforcement.
105. See COPIC's 3Rs PROGRAM NEWSLETTER (Mar. 2004), available at http://www.callco
pic.comlpublications/3rs/vol-1 issue_1_mar_2004.pdf (last visited May 31, 2006).
106. See generally William M. Sage, Medical Liability and Patient Safety, HEALTH AFF.,
July-/Aug. 2003, at 26, 30-31 (describing the need to balance accountability with encouragement
of error reporting); see also Martin J. Hatlie & Susan E. Sheridan, Perspective: The Medical
Liability Crisis Of 2003: Must We Squander The Chance To Put Patients First?, HEALTH AFF.,
July-/Aug. 2003, at 37, 39 (urging that the NPDB "be replaced with a requirement that every
medical liability claim filed trigger a report to and at least a cursory investigation by the
agencies with responsibility for licensing the organization and the defendants named in the
claim").
107. See generally Lawrence E. Smarr, Comparative Assessment of the PIAA Data Sharing
Project and the National Practitioner Data Bank: Policy, Purpose, and Application, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1997, at 59, 67-70 (detailing the problems with the NPDB).
108. See Joshua Graff Zivin & Alexander S.P. Pfaff, To Err on Humans is Not Benign:
Incentives for Adoption of Medical Error Reporting Systems, 23 J. HEALTH ECON. 935, 945-46
(2004) (advocating a system with such incentives).
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All in all, reputation militates against individual physician
reporting of medical errors to aggregate data repositories, as
contrasted with disclosing events privately to patients. However,
maintaining or expanding reporting obligations for hospitals, HMOs,
or other organized health care providers might create net public policy
benefits. Corporate reputation is significantly more straightforward
than individual reputation, though just as jealously guarded. Unlike
individual professionals, corporate providers rarely fear complete loss
of livelihood as the result of individual events becoming public, have
less emotion invested in their day-to-day activities, maintain
communications and marketing departments to reduce unwarranted
harm to reputation, and regard government regulation as an
unavoidable cost of doing business. This is particularly true for high-
profile academic medical centers, which tend to be regarded as
responsible for the quality of care within their walls to a greater
degree than the average community hospital. 10 9 These characteristics,
combined with the consensus described above regarding the systemic
origin of most medical errors, might generate a productive response
from hospital reporting and disclosure mandates. However, public
oversight would be necessary to root out sophisticated evasions and to
ensure that hospitals did not merely scapegoat individual health
professionals.
C. Quality and Safety
Sound information policy requires thinking more carefully
about the relationship between "quality" and "safety." Both health
policy experts and the public tend to use the terms as loose synonyms
for desirable attributes of health care. Sometimes, safety is referred
to as a subset of quality, with the rhetorical goal of preventing
complacency and keeping funds flowing to "quality improvement" after
a handful of changes to the safety environment have been
implemented and interest in a high-profile case of medical error has
faded. However, eliding the distinction between quality and safety in
this fashion conceals deeper questions.
One appeal of "safety" is that it reinforces public perceptions of
health care as lifesaving-perceptions that have been carefully
cultivated by the medical profession. Health care is such a challenge
for public policy in part because the familiar relational image of
physician and patient suggests that identified rather than statistical
109. E.g., William M. Sage, Malpractice, Patient Safety, and the Personification of Medical
Injury: Opportunities for Academic Medicine, 81 ACAD. MED. 823 (2006).
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lives are at stake, making it seem immoral to apply a cost criterion to
many treatment decisions. Investments in something as tangible as
"safety," as opposed to amorphous "quality," strike the public as modal
not marginal, offering seemingly large payoffs in the preservation of
identified lives.110 Hence the political significance of the controversy
over the exact mortality implications of medical errors: 98,000
avoidable deaths per year, or some lower number because the
remainder would have died anyway within a short time.'
A second reason why politicians, and health care scholars who
embrace paradigms other than market competition, focus on safety is
that it seems to obviate considerations of cost irrespective of whether
identified or statistical lives are at stake. Safety gains, somewhat
misleadingly, have been portrayed as low-hanging fruit-
improvements that no rational human would refuse. This allows
safety advocates to sidestep differences between professionally
determined (sometimes deemed "scientific" or "medicalist") standards
for how, and how much, society should invest in health care, and
"marketist" standards that attempt to honor consumer preferences for
allocating scarce funds among a variety of costly goods and services.
1 2
Neither of these arguments is conclusive, and both distort
information policy for malpractice and medical error. Safety problems
may be more visible than quality problems, but may also be less
meaningful to procuring long-term gains in the effectiveness (and cost-
effectiveness) of health care.
113
One set of caveats affects individual users of reported or
disclosed information. Identified deaths from avoidable medical errors
are very salient, especially when they unexpectedly befall young
people such as Libby Zion or Jesica Santillan. 114 But consumers and
110. See David C. Hadorn, Setting Health Care Priorities in Oregon: Cost-Effectiveness Meets
the Rule of Rescue, 265 JAMA 2218, 2219 (1991) (criticizing Oregon's Medicaid rationing plan for
ignoring identified lives). But see Lisa Heinzerling, Note, The Rights of Statistical People, 24
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 189 (2000) (rejecting the distinction between identified and statistical
lives).
111. Troyen A. Brennan et al., Accidental Deaths, Saved Lives, and Improved Quality, 353
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1405, 1405 (2005). For criticism and debate of the IOM report, see Lucian L.
Leape, Institute of Medicine Medical Error Figures are Not Exaggerated, 284 JAMA 95 (2000);
Clement J. McDonald et al., Deaths Due to Medical Errors are Exaggerated in Institute of
Medicine Report 284 JAMA 93 (2000); Brennan, supra note 20; Christopher M. Hughes et al.,
Letter to the Editor, How Many Deaths Due to Medical Error?, 284 JAMA 2187 (2000); Clement
J. McDonald et al., Reply, 284 JAMA 2188 (2000).
112. See SHERRY GLIED, CHRONIC CONDITION: WHY HEALTH REFORM FAILS 17-35 (1997)
(distinguishing marketist and medicalist perspectives).
113. See generally Troyen A. Brennan, supra note Il1 (advocating focus on quality
improvement measures, rather than safety measures).
114. Libby Zion's death at New York Hospital in 1984 as the result of an unrecognized drug
interaction eventually led to the adoption of limits on hours worked by physicians in training.
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patients may mistake salience for frequency or apply other heuristics
that derive oversimplified and incorrect lessons about the dangers of
medical care and how to protect themselves.
Another set of caveats affects regulators and professional self-
regulatory bodies. The salience of avoidable deaths from error makes
them seem more closely linked to moral failures than do overall
limitations on the medical profession's ability to prevent or treat
disease, and therefore more important to address. However, teasing
out root causes of high-profile mishaps and imposing process
modifications in the emotional, contentious domain of medical
malpractice may be more difficult and costly than implementing
routine quality improvements. Exposure of safety lapses presents a
starker tradeoff between serving public values and causing providers
embarrassment and reputational harm, which in turn can reduce their
willingness to reveal their own errors while, through cognitive
dissonance, making them less receptive to lessons from others'
experiences. An example is "sign your site" campaigns to prevent
wrong-side surgery. Despite a series of high-profile cases and
attempts at process re-engineering, many surgeons still refuse to
participate on the grounds that they would never make such a glaring
mistake.115
Physician and hospital report cards disclosing mortality
statistics for cardiac surgery are another example. Report card
initiatives tend to be popular in states (e.g., New York and
Pennsylvania) with strong "health planning" traditions, such as
certificate-of-need requirements for hospitals. At first glance, this
seems surprising, because comparative mortality statistics are usually
promoted as consumer aids, a strategy that should be most compatible
with a competition-oriented philosophy of government. However,
surgical report cards have seldom been shown to matter
competitively. 116  Rather, following a "performance rationale" for
See generally David A. Asche & Ruth M. Parker, The Libby Zion Case: One Step Forward or Two
Steps Backward?, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED. 771, 773-75 (1988) (describing the circumstances of the
Zion case and the social pressures for working long hours). Jesica Santillan's death at Duke
Medical Center in 2004 after transplantation of an incompatible organ focused attention on error
disclosure and apology. See Randal C. Archibold, Girl in Transplant Mix-Up Dies After Two
Weeks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2003, at A18 (describing the Santillan case).
115. Sandra G. Boodman, To Reduce Errors, Cut Here: New Rules Require Doctors to ID
Patients, Take "Time Outs" and Sign Their Work, WASH. POST, July 6, 2004, at Fl; Sandra G.
Boodman, No End to Errors, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2002, at F1.
116. See Eric C. Schneider & Arnold M. Epstein, Use of Public Performance Reports: A
Survey of Patients Undergoing Cardiac Surgery, 279 JAMA 1638, 1638 (1998) (finding that fewer
than one percent of patients knew their physician's report card score and said that it had a
moderate or major impact on their choice of doctor); Eric C. Schneider & Arnold M. Epstein,
Influence of Cardiac-Surgery Performance Reports on Referral Practices and Access to Care: A
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disclosure, they seem to stimulate professional programs of self-
improvement and help justify decisions by regulators to subject under-
performing programs to intensive oversight and possible closure.11 7
The consumerist overlay of report cards is partly accidental-New
York only grudgingly revealed physician-specific data after a
newspaper filed suit under the state's freedom of information act-but
partly represents a Faustian bargain. When states dressed up
workaday quality-related regulatory activities as life-or-death safety
disclosure for patients, the programs became more popular politically.
However, doing so also may have led physicians to refuse more
difficult cases and otherwise "game" the report card system because
such dramatic statistics presented in a public forum were threatening
to their reputations.
1 18
At bottom, both quality and safety improvements in health care
save statistical lives, not identified lives, and cost is always at issue.
One source of confusion is that safety risks in most other areas (e.g.,
environmental exposure from manufacturing or freeway deaths from
automobile design and operation) are secondary aspects of the activity
being conducted (making products or traveling from place to place,
respectively). By contrast, prevention and treatment of physical harm
is the primary purpose of health care, so physical safety is perceived
as integral, not tangential, to the medical enterprise. Safety
prevention therefore falls into the same quasi-identified-life trap as
overall health policy: acute care takes precedence over public health,
which in turn takes precedence over health-improving investments
such as shelter or education that are not within the work domain of
traditional health professionals. With respect to cost, quality and
safety draw from the same pool of dollars-the funds society allocates
to health care services-and there is no reason to believe, a priori, that
safety represents the most cost-effective investment. The principal
lesson for information policy is that both competitive and
performance-enhancing uses of data reporting or disclosure might
Survey of Cardiovascular Specialists, 335 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 251, 251 (1996) (finding that report
cards have minimal impact on physicians' referral recommendations).
117. See Mark R. Chassin, Achieving and Sustaining Improved Quality: Lessons from New
York State and Cardiac Surgery, HEALTH AFF., July/Aug. 2002, at 40,42 (finding that hospitals
identified in public reports as outliers for high mortality rates attracted attention from the media
and the health department); Mark R. Chassin et al., Benefits and Hazards of Reporting Medical
Outcomes Publicly, 334 NEW ENG. J. MED. 394, 397-98 (1996) (asserting that hospitals changed
practices in response to disclosure by, using the data to identify specific processes and programs
to improve).
118. See generally Dranove et al., supra note 104 (finding that cardiac surgery report cards
increase cost and worsen outcomes by delaying care as many providers attempt to select patients
by severity of illness, channeling healthier patients into unnecessary bypass surgery, and
denying surgery to sicker patients).
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benefit from focusing on overall quality measures, such as evidence-
based medical practice or consumer satisfaction, rather than
malpractice and medical error, if it can be shown that the former
category of behavior will be easier and cheaper to change.
V. SOME RECOMMENDATIONS
The third medical malpractice crisis in the past thirty years
appears to be coming to an end, with the insurance cycle seeming to
turn once again toward lower premiums and greater availability of
coverage. 119  Neither can the political process sustain a crisis
mentality forever. Yet problems of excessive medical error,
inadequate patient compensation, potential future insurance
volatility, and poor communications remain.
Among possible reforms, information-based regulation of
medical liability is likely to outlive the current crisis, in large part
because-as a result of attention paid to patient safety in the 1990s-
it also predates it. Information-based regulation is also a consensus
approach that is less vulnerable to political gridlock than more
polarized proposals like caps on malpractice damages. Similarly, the
fact that information-based regulation can be customized to the
medical context makes it less threatening than generic tort reform to
defenders of the litigation status quo.
Harnessing the power of information within the health care
system as well as from without requires careful consideration of the
effects created by any disclosure policy. 120 Although all the principal
players in health care-patients, doctors, hospitals, insurers,
government-prefer to avoid errors, they do so for different reasons.
Health care providers desire information so that they can identify
appropriate changes to the care delivery system. Consumers desire it
so that they can make informed decisions and, in turn, provide
practitioners with incentives to deliver quality care. Physicians' fears
of public market-driven or bureaucratic responses compromise private
self-regulatory ones, potentially stifling internal improvement efforts
in order to ensure that damaging information does not end up in
external hands. Indeed, the Institute of Medicine's recommendation of
a mandatory event reporting system for actual injuries accompanied
by a voluntary and confidential one for near misses should be viewed
119. TOM BAKER, THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE MYTH 62-63 (2005) (arguing that medical
malpractice insurance premiums are not too high).
120. See generally Charles Vincent, Understanding and Responding to Adverse Events, 348




as an earnest effort to negotiate some space between the two
approaches.
Unfortunately, conventional wisdom has come to regard any
effort to augment malpractice claiming and compensation by making
information accessible to the legal system as correspondingly reducing
information available to physicians to help curtail medical errors.
This reasoning has acquired iconic status among physicians in the five
years since To Err Is Human posited a tension between external
accountability and internal safety improvement. And, like most
conventional wisdom, it does have some truth. If one wants reports of
errors that people can learn from, one has to make it safe for people to
generate those reports.
However, the traditional tort reform community-physicians,
liability insurers, and general business interests-was unable to
leverage the logic of the IOM's internal improvement message into
support for damage caps and other established tort reforms. The
public drew a sharply different lesson from the IOM's report than was
drawn by the medical profession. To the public, the IOM report
confirmed that a lot was going wrong in medicine, making it more
important for patients to learn the facts so that providers who are
responsible could be avoided or held to account.
It is therefore important to find informational messages that
appeal to audiences both inside and outside of medicine. This Article
argues for a pragmatic policy based on distinguishing regulatory from
relational uses of information. This approach divides the universe of
information about medical liability and patient safety into three
definable, manageable areas.
One category encompasses information that helps individual
patients make the experience of receiving medical care as good as
possible even if a less than ideal clinical outcome ensues. As a general
matter, the Article supports legal and ethical requirements that
obligate health care providers to tell patients about medical errors or
unexpected events that affect them. The second category is
information about improving aggregate patient safety. Here, the
Article finds a closer question. Information that enables critical
analysis of error can be very powerful, but usually not in competitive,
marketplace terms. Instead, it is likely most valuable in facilitating
direct government regulation or professional self-regulation of safety,
primarily at the institutional (hospital) level. In other words, this
information has substantial collective value but limited private utility
in individual transactions. A third category of information captures
how cost-effectively the malpractice system promotes social goals such
as deterrence, compensation, and justice, and represents a form of
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democratic accountability for courts and insurance regulators rather
than an oversight mechanism for individual provider entities.
Specific recommendations emerge from the Article's analysis.
First, because of physicians' reputational sensitivities, statistical
aggregation issues, and the greater potential of systems-based efforts
to stimulate improvement, information aimed at heightening patient
safety should be reported publicly for institutions but not for
individual professionals. Public information available about
physicians should be limited to results of formal disciplinary
processes, despite the political challenge of separating systems
improvement from culling of individual "bad apples." A corollary is
that the malpractice reporting portion of the NPDB should be
repealed. As currently constituted, NPDB reporting discourages
settlements of claims, impairs openness, prompts defensive medicine,
and tempts hospitals to help physicians evade reporting-all without
providing useful aggregate data that furthers performance
improvement. At the same time, however, institutions need strong
incentives to monitor professionals practicing within their walls.
Second, voluntary mechanisms can be leveraged to identify the
proper unit of clinical organization for information reporting and
disclosure. In 2002, the Institute of Medicine proposed federal
funding for state-based demonstrations of comprehensive malpractice
reform within medical institutions that have demonstrated capacity to
protect patient safety and that choose to substitute administrative
compensation for traditional litigation. Implementing legislation is
currently before Congress.1 21 Opt-in opportunities of this sort are
useful indicators of the optimal level of aggregation for data about
patient safety. Hospitals or physician groups that elect to participate
in demonstration projects become natural subjects for information
reporting and disclosure, as well as test cases for various evaluation
methods. Unlike opt-in reporting generally, which compromises
findings because of selection bias, the assumption underlying these
malpractice reform proposals is that the institutions that have the
strongest potential for improvement will be the ones to respond to
incentives for participation and accept increased accountability.
Third, data for overall assessment of the malpractice system
need to be integrated, but in most instances the data can also be de-
identified to reduce reputational and privacy risks to individual
providers and patients. Existing "silos" of public information-
121. See generally INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, FOSTERING RAPID ADVANCES IN HEALTH CARE,
supra note 7, at 81-89 (discussing possible statewide demonstrations of comprehensive liability
reform); Fair and Reliable Medical Justice Act, S. 1337, 109th Cong. (2005).
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including clinical, judicial, and insurance repositories-should be
linked in order to paint a complete picture of medical injury, dispute
resolution, compensation, and financial responsibility. For example,
current data on liability insurance claims often lack provider- and
patient-related information essential to understanding how liability
affects health care delivery and hence medical cost, access, and
quality. Long delays between medical errors, legal claims (when they
occur), and insurance payments also tend to limit the policy relevance
of single-regulator data collections.
Fourth, individual patients suffering injuries should have
maximum freedom to receive and convey information, including the
ability to communicate their personal experiences to others. This
includes mandatory disclosure of error to involved patients and
families, as well as prohibitions on sealing court records and the use of
confidentiality agreements in settlements to preclude release of
information about circumstances of injury (as opposed to amount of
payment). This conclusion recognizes a pragmatic tradeoff. A direct-
to-patient disclosure mandate without a public reporting obligation
raises search costs for other current and future patients seeking
similar information. However, it also keeps information with high
reputational sensitivity out of government's hands, and generates a
reliable market price for that information by forcing private actors to
surface it if they desire it.
Fifth, public subsidies will be necessary to induce the
production and analysis of information for patient safety
improvement. 122 This information is a partial public good; its benefits
extend beyond those who might pay to collect it. The value of
aggregate patient safety information lies in its spillover social utility,
not in its private usefulness to seller-providers and buyer-users of
medical care in identifiable transactions. Consequently, competitive
mechanisms for generating information are likely to prove
insufficient, even if first-mover problems are overcome through
disclosure mandates. For these reasons, federal health programs such
as Medicare likely will have a major role to play in malpractice
information policy as well as in malpractice reform generally.123
122. See Zivin & Pfaff, supra note 108, at 937-38, 946 (discussing and recommending
subsidies).
123. William M. Sage & Eleanor D. Kinney, Medicare-Led Malpractice Reform, in MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE AND THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 318 (William M. Sage & Rogan Kersh eds.,
2006).
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